The regulations for South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States differed from those of Abyei. The basic provisions of the agreement did not have a direct impact on the two states, as the PCA assumed that they would remain in the North. However, both regions, located on the north-south border, were severely affected by the war, especially after its resumption in 1983. Local complaints about the control of the country have prompted some sections of the population to side with the South. The APC therefore recognized that any comprehensive regulation must address the problems of these states. They received a slightly different governance structure with more detailed provisions on state-local government relations and revenue sharing. The APC also established a land commission in each state to settle the territorial disputes that formed the heart of much of the conflict. Finally, a monitoring committee was set up in each of the two States to study the impact of the implementation of the PCA, and the issue was raised that the populations of both States should be consulted, but without specifying how or when. The Wealth Sharing Agreement was one of the six protocols of the PCA. Revenue-sharing provisions have been a key element of the PCA, as the country is heavily dependent on oil revenues. This is especially true for the South, whose budget is 98% financed by oil revenues. Disagreement over oilfield control and revenue distribution is therefore the greatest threat to peace in Sudan, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. The APC has ordered that 2% of all revenues be shared by oil-producing states, while the rest is divided equally between the government of South Sudan on the one hand and the national government and states of North Sudan on the other.
This revenue-sharing agreement will end in July 2011 – and probably sooner if the South secedes – making a new sharing of oil revenues a priority for all parties. This relatively unknown legal agreement is necessary regardless of the size of your business. Any professional accounting firm that wishes to enter into a mutual agreement with U.S.-IQAB must submit a letter of intent to NASBA. The letter must include a brief written description of the nature and objectives of the organization, the size of its members, and its interest in applying for an MRA. If the organization does not have the authority to grant exercise privileges, including audit rights, it must provide evidence that it can facilitate the obtaining of these privileges for U.S. CPAs from the licensing authority. A collaborative practice agreement may be called a consultation agreement, a doctor-pharmacist agreement, a standing order or a physician`s protocol or delegation. The APC`s asset allocation system only became fully operational in 2008 – and even then, its implementation was hampered by political tensions and weak administrative capacity.
In particular, delays in implementation have been linked to a lack of trust between the NCP and the SPLM/SPLA. The lack of transparency in Sudan`s oil sector has also undermined progress in implementation, as evidenced by the lack of publicly available information on contracts between the Sudanese government and its investors. And the lack of information on the country`s total oil production and the amount of revenue received makes it almost impossible to independently verify the amount of oil production, production and revenues. Currently, oil accounts for 98% of the Revenue of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the majority of oil fields are located in the south. Although the GoSS receives oil revenues (from one year after the signing of the PCA) in accordance with the terms of the asset-sharing agreement, its lack of ability to plan, allocate and spend these resources would have facilitated an increase in corruption within the SPLM/APLS. The lack of progress in defining the north-south border has also hampered the creation of a framework for calculating oil wealth in border areas. On the 11th. In October 2007, the SPLM withdrew from the Government of National Unity (UNOG), accusing the central government of violating the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
In particular, the SPLM notes that the Khartoum-based government, dominated by the National Congress Party, has failed to withdraw more than 15,000 troops from the southern oil fields and has failed to implement the Protocol on Abyei. The SPLM said it would not return to war, while analysts noted that the agreement had collapsed for some time, particularly due to the international community`s focus on the conflict in neighboring Darfur. [2] The SPLM announced that it would join the government on December 13, 2007 following an agreement. The agreement stipulates that the seat of government will rotate every three months between Juba and Khartoum, although it seems that this will be largely symbolic, as will the funding of a census (crucial for the referendum) and a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from across the border. [3] The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Kenya on January 9, 2005 by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement marked the end of two decades of civil war and was the culmination of peace negotiations supported by the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), as well as the United Kingdom, Norway, the United States and Italy. The PCA represented a last desperate attempt to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict that had divided North and South Sudan since its independence from Egyptian and British rule in 1956. The first phase of the conflict ended in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, negotiated by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. In 1983, however, then-President Jafaar Numeiri violated the terms of the agreement by restricting the prerogatives of the South and introducing Sharia law, and war resumed. The CPA is based on a collection of documents negotiated and signed over a two-year period.
It consists of six documents: the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, the Safeguards Agreement of September 2003; the Convention on the Distribution of Assets of January 2004; the May 2004 Power-Sharing Protocol; the Protocol on the Settlement of the Conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States of May 2004; and the Protocol on Conflict Resolution in the Abyei Region of May 2004. The 250-page agreement created a comprehensive system for the equitable sharing of electricity and oil revenues between North and South; In detail, it is a document of enormous complexity, a clear reminder that Sudan is torn apart by several overlapping conflicts and not just by a split between the Arab and Islamic North and the South African and Christian or animist, as is often portrayed. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement therefore includes provisions not only for South Sudan, but also for three areas that are technically north of the 1956 border between north and south: the Abyei region, South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States. All three are affected by the conflict, their populations are divided in their loyalty and run the risk of becoming hot spots at the time of referendums. Despite years of negotiations and careful attention to the details contained in the agreement, sufficient doubts remained as to whether it would provide a lasting solution to the long-standing North-South conflict that the document contained an alternative clause. The PCA demanded that at the end of a six-year period, in January 2011, a referendum on independence be held, giving the people of South Sudan the opportunity to choose between maintaining the power-sharing agreement or deciding on full independence through the secession of the north. .