We are developing a new theoretical framework for the formation of trade agreements (TA), called « parallel competition », which focuses on the political struggle for the ratification of ta in countries. Ratification of technical assistance is inherently uncertain in any country where anti- and pro-trade interest groups struggle to influence the ratification decisions of their own governments. Unlike the previous literature, the protection incorporated in negotiated rates for technical assistance reflects a balance between the liberalizing power of lobbying and the inherently protectionist preferences of government. In addition, new international political externalities are emerging that are not internalized by governments that only internalize the externalities of the terms of trade. If you have written this article and are not yet registered with RePEc, we recommend that you do so here. This allows you to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential quotes on this item that we are not sure about. Political Economy – Development: Home Development Strategies eJournal Subscribe to this free journal for more articles on the subject. . Organizations and Markets: eJournal Guidelines and Processes. If you know of any missing elements that cite this article, you can help us create these links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above for each referring element. If you are a registered author of this article, you can also check the « Quote » tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as some quotes may be awaiting confirmation. Streatham CourtXfi Building, Rennes Dr.Exeter, EX4 4JHUnited Kingdom Political Economy: Taxation, Subsidies, & Revenue eJournal International Political Economy: Trade Policy eJournal University Park11200 SW 8th StreetMiami, FL 33199United States Please note that corrections may take a few weeks to filter the different RePEc services.

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